[ofa-general] Re: [PATCH] saquery: --smkey command line option

[Sasha Khapyorsky]

On 04:15 Fri 23 May     , Hal Rosenstock wrote:
> 
> > but now in IBA spec knowing a valid
> > SM_Key is mandatory for privileged SA clients (which need to get whole
> > list of MCMemberRecord, ServiceInfo, etc.).
> 
> It's a grey area.

I don't see this as "grey" - spec is very clear about this sort of SA
restrictions.

> The issue is what the privileged SA clients should be
> used for.

It can be used for monitoring, SA DB sync/dump, debugging, etc..

> I think this use case allows much more common knowledge of the
> management keys (in this case the SA key) as it will not just be the
> network administrator using it and even if it were, the user would be
> looking over his shoulder.

A network administrator is not a little kid :) and this option is
optional. Following your logic we will need to disable root passwords
typing too.

> That more common knowledge allows for a
> malicious user to more easily compromise the subnet.

There is nothing which could prevent from a malicious user to put things
in the code.

> A better approach to all these trust issues IMO is to use the OpenSM
> console to support these types of operations.

OpenSM console is not protected even by SM_Key. And what about
diagnostics when other SMs are used?

Sasha